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lature has escalated the battle to prohibit the possession, manufacture, sale and advertisement of
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With the adoption of Florida Statutes §§893.145, 893.146, and
893.147,1 the Florida Legislature has escalated the battle to prohibit
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.145-47 (Supp. 1980):
893.145 Drug paraphernalia defined. The term "drug paraphernalia" means
all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, intended for
use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvest-
ing, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing,
testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, in-
jecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter. Drug paraphernalia is deemed to be
contraband which shall be subject to civil forfeiture. It includes, but is not lim-
ited to:
(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating,
cultivating, growing, or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled
substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived.
(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances.
(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in in-
creasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance.
(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identi-
fying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of, controlled
substances.
(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weigh-
ing or measuring controlled substances.
(6) Diluents and adulterances, such as quinine hydrocholoride, mannitol,
mannite, dextrose, and lactose used, intended for use, or designed for use in cut-
ting controlled substances.
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in
removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, cannabis.
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended
for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances.
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, intended for
use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances.
(10) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use
in storing or concealing controlled substances.
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use,
1
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the possession, manufacture, sale and advertisement of drug parapher-
or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human
body.
(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhal-
ing, or otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the
human body, such as:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or
without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls.
(b) Water pipes.
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices.
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks.
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a
cannabis cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand.
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials.
(g) Chamber pipes.
(h) Carburetor pipes.
(i) Electric pipes.
Ci) Air-driven pipes.
(k) Chillums.
(1) Bongs.
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
893.146 Determination of paraphernalia. In determining whether an object
is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority or jury shall consider, in addi-
tion to all other logically relevant factors, the following:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning
its use.
(2) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this act.
(3) The proximity of the object to controlled substances.
(4) The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object.
(5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone
in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reason-
ably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act. The inno-
cence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of
this act shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use, or designed
for use, as drug paraphernalia.
(6) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use.
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict
its use.
(8) Any advertising concerning its use.
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale.
(10) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/6
Dr1 Parphrnli86
5:1980
nalia. Taken with some modifications from the Model Drug Parapher-
nalia Act (MDPA),2 the new statutes are the latest in Florida's at-
tempts to stem the tide of increasing drug abuse.
Not a unidimensional conflict, Florida's struggle reflects our soci-
ety's drug dilemma. A nationwide study of high school seniors during
1975-79 showed an appreciable rise in illicit drug use, particularly ma-
rijuana and cocaine. Trends in use at lower grade levels showed mari-
or dealer of tobacco products.
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object or
objects to the total sales of the business enterprise.
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the
community.
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.
893.147 Possession, manufacture, delivery, or advertisement of drug
paraphernalia;
(1) Possession of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any person to possess
drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable as provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083,
or s. 775.084.
(2) Manufacture or delivery of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any
person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasona-
bly should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into
the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act. Any person who
violates this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as pro-
vided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Delivery of drug paraphernalia to a minor. Any person 18 years of age
or over who violates subsection (2) by delivering drug paraphernalia to a person
under 18 years of age is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as
provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) Advertisement of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any person to
place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertise-
ment, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that
the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of
objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. Any person who vio-
lates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as
provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MODEL DRUG PARAPHER-
NALIA ACT (1979) [hereinafter cited as MDPA].
651Drug Paraphernalia
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juana use rising steadily at all grades down through the eighth grade.3
Florida's own intense problem is demonstrated by U.S. Customs statis-
tics showing that almost 44% of the cocaine seized nationwide in 1978-
79 was in the Miami district."
Supporting drug paraphernalia laws are parents groups, the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice, state
and local law enforcement agencies, the White House,5 and various
state and local bodies, including the Florida Legislature. From their
perspective, the legal sale of drug. paraphernalia encourages drug
abuse, particularly among children and teens, through easy availability
of drug accessories. Peter Bensinger, administrator of the Drug En-
forcement Administration, presented their arguments in his statement
before the House Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse and Control,
"the paraphernalia industry, by its very existence. . . is condoning -
even advocating - the use of illegal controlled substances." He fur-
ther characterized the paraphernalia industry as a "multi-million dollar
big business that facilitates and glamorizes drug use ' 7 while preying on
the drug fantasies of youth. It is a natural step from this point of view
to an attack on the "head shops"8 that distribute drug accessories. Par-
ents' groups participate by lobbying for state and local laws, pressuring
merchants, and waging fierce public relations campaigns.9 Even Mc-
Donald's joined the fight by changing the design of its coffee stirrers
when drug users were discovered using them to inhale cocaine and
PCP, an animal tranquilizer 0 commonly known as angel dust. The
3. L. JOHNSON, J. BACHMAN, & P. O'MALLEY, 1979 HIGHLIGHTS: DRUGS AND
THE NATION'S HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, FIVE YEAR NATIONAL TRENDS (DHEW Pub.
No. (ADM) 80-930 1979).
4. NAT'L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, Drug Abuse Indicator Trends, I PRO-
CEEDINGS 115 (1979).
5. Myers, DEA Legal Counsel Official Explains Paraphernalia Issue, 10 NAR-
COTICS CONTROL DIG. 6 (1980).
6. Hearings of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Peter Bensinger).
7. Id. at 1.
8. See High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 366 n.2 (1978) for a
definition.
9. Satchell, Head Shops: Gateway to the Drug Scene, Fort Lauderdale News/
Sun Sentinel, June 15, 1980, (Parade Magazine), at 5, col. 4.
10. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1979, §1, at 8, col. 6.
166 Nova Law Journal 5:19801
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fight continues in Florida with the advent of sections 893.145-893.147.
Aligned against these groups are head shop owners, the parapher-
nalia industry, and libertarians. In their view, anti-paraphernalia laws
penalize legitimate businesses and deprive adults of their free speech"'
and property rights through their vagueness, overbreadth and propen-
sity to selective enforcement. They allege further that anti-parapherna-
lia laws are absurd and impractical, akin to "banning swizzle sticks to
prevent alcoholism."12 In addition, they point to the disparity between
the trend toward decriminalizing marijuana while imposing criminal
sanctions on possession of paraphernalia. 13
Historical Background
Although expanding drug use and the mushroom-like growth of
the accessories industry have sparked renewed interest in anti-para-
phernalia laws, this conflict is not a new one. Nor is it Florida's first
experience with drug paraphernalia laws. In 1969, Florida enacted its
first statute prohibiting both possession and sale of drug paraphernalia.
However, only a few possession cases14 and no sale cases arose under
that statute. The sale prohibition was consequently repealed when Flor-
ida adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in 1973.15
Florida's 1969 provision was similar to general "implements of
crime"16 laws, with the added element of intent that the "device, con-
11. Antanoff, Those Mothers Are Trampling Adult Rights, 59 HIGH TIMES 8
(1980). The Florida Bar was also opposed to Senate Bill 291 on the latter two grounds,
Fla. Bar News, May 15, 1980, at 10, col. 3.
12. Antanoff, supra note 11, at 8.
13. Id.
14. Kirtley v. State, 245 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Goble v.
State, 324 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Turner v. State, 329 So. 2d 360
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Davis v. State, 371 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Dacus v. State, 307 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Merit v. State,
342 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Falin v. State, 367 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); D.M.M. v. State, 275 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
15. Florida adopted the major provision of the U.S.C.A. with numerous varia-
tions, omissions and additions in The Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 190 (1979).
16. Christianson, Heroin Paraphernalia: Breakdown of a Fix, 10 CaiM. L.
BULL. 493 (1974).
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trivance, instrument, or paraphernalia be used for unlawfully" 17 ad-
ministering any controlled substance. Today the Drug Enforcement
Administration uses the implements of crime analogy to support the
MDPA, comparing it to other federal paraphernalia laws. 8 However, it
was that same analogy which weakened some prior implement of crime
statutes. In Rosenberg v. United States,19 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that lactose, dextrose, quinine, and gelatin cap-
sules were not "instruments," "tools," or "implements" within the
meaning of a statute making it illegal to possess the implements of a
crime.2" In 1973, the same court reversed the appellant's conviction in
Williams v. United States.21 The Court found that the possession of a
small, wooden pipe without further evidence as to its shape and size,
and absent evidence as to nature and significance of marijuana residue,
did not have the "sinister" implication of possession of the implements
and tools of a crime.22 Mere possession of the pipe was not sufficient to
support a conviction of possessing the implements of a crime, e.g., nar-
cotics paraphernalia.
The general "implements of crime" statutes have another flaw in
their application to non-traditional drug paraphernalia. That flaw is the
inability of statutes initially drawn up for heroin control2s to extend to
other items such as the rolling papers used with marijuana, the pipes
used with hashish, and the mirrors and razor blades used with cocaine.
The items used to administer these controlled substances are far re-
moved from the more blatant paraphernalia of heroin use, and are not
commonly thought of as narcotics paraphernalia. This common experi-
ence provided the underlying reasoning in Cole v. State of Oklahoma24
17. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a)(4) (1969).
18. Myers, supra note 5, at 6. Myers cites examples in which the DEA compares
drug paraphernalia laws to federal firearms statutes (26 U.S.C. § 5845), moonshine
paraphernalia laws (26 U.S.C. § 5686), wagering paraphernalia laws (18 U.S.C. §§
1952, 1953), counterfeiting paraphernalia statutes (18 U.S.C. § 492), wiretapping and
eavesdropping paraphernalia statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2512), and illicit tobacco parapher-
nalia statutes (26 U.S.C. § 5763).
19. 297 A.2d 763 (D.C. 1972).
20. Id. at 766.
21. 304 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1973).
22. Id. at 289.
23. Christianson, supra note 16, at 508-10.
24. 511 P.2d 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
168 5:1980 1Nova Law Journal
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where that state's drug paraphernalia statute was found invalid. The
court noted that a person of ordinary intelligence could not determine
what was or was not legal to possess.2 5
Although Florida attempted to cure the flaw of a general imple-
ments of crime statute by adding the element of criminal intent, the
provision was unsatisfactory from a prosecutorial point of view. De-
pending on the charges, possession of narcotics paraphernalia could ei-
ther be a felony of the third degree or a misdemeanor of the first de-
gree.2 6 Failure to charge a felony in informations and confusion by trial
courts in classifying offenses caused sentences to be reduced.27
The standard of actual knowledge28 found necessary by the courts
was also difficult to prove. Evidence of possession was legally insuffi-
cient unless it could be shown by direct evidence that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the presence of drug paraphernalia, or unless
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could
lawfully infer such knowledge.2 9
Possession of narcotics paraphernalia was frequently tacked onto
charges of possession of a controlled substance 0 in an effort to obtain
convictions by broadening the charges. In light of these circumstances,
it is likely that Florida prosecutors would have joined with the Rosen-
berg1 trial judge's appeal for a "comprehensive and up-to-date narcot-
ics paraphernalia statute. '3 2 The inadequacy of implements of crime
statutes in dealing with non-traditional narcotics paraphernalia meant
the struggle was not over.
Analysis of Florida's New Drug Paraphernalia Statute
The Drug Enforcement Administration presented the MDPA to
states and local communities as the next strategy in the fight against
drug abuse.3 3 In adopting a modified version of the act, Florida endeav-
25. Id. at 595.
26. 371 So. 2d 721.
27. Id.; 329 So. 2d 360; 342 So. 2d 993.
28. 275 So. 2d 308; 245 So. 2d 282; 324 So. 2d 97.
29. 324 So. 2d at 98.
30. 245 So. 2d 282; 307 So. 2d 505; 324 So. 2d 993; 324 So. 2d 97.
31. 297 A.2d 763.
32. Id. at 766.
33. MDPA, supra note 2, at Prefatory Note.
69 115:1980
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ors to go far beyond the short statutory paragraph34 which formerly
dealt with drug paraphernalia. The new statute includes a definition of
drug paraphernalia and gives common examples, provides a procedure
for determining whether the object is drug paraphernalia, and prohibits
possession, manufacture, delivery, and advertisement of drug parapher-
nalia.3 5 It also amends two current sections of Florida Statutes to pro-
vide for the forfeiture of drug paraphernalia and to delete provisions
relating to drug paraphernalia respectively.36 Penalties, 7 a severance
clause,38 and an effective date3 9 complete the law. Florida's new statute
differs, however, from the original language of the MDPA,' 0 particu-
larly, in one critical area.41 The section prohibiting possession of drug
paraphernalia does not include the intent element embodied in the orig-
inal language "to use, or to possess with intent to use . . . in violation
of this act."'42
At this point, two crucial inquiries must be presented for consider-
ation. First, can the new statute survive challenges that it violates con-
stitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection? Second, will
the new statute be an effective tool in controlling drug abuse?
In response to these questions, MDPA proponents contend that it
contains all the elements necessary to succeed where other statutes and
ordinances have failed.4 In support of this, they refer to Record
Revolution, No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma"" and World Imports, Inc. v.
Woodbridge Township, 5 where MDPA-based ordinances nearly identi-
34. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a)(4) (1969).
35. FLA. STAT. § 893.145-47 (Supp. 1980).
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.12(2), 13(3)(a) (1969).
37. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a) (Supp. 1980).
38. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6) (Supp. 1980).
39. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7) (Supp. 1980) (effective date October 1, 1980).
40. MDPA, supra note 2.
41. Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Florida, No. TA 80-0954, slip op.
at 6 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
42. Cf. text of FLA. STAT. § 893.146(11) (Supp. 1980) cited in note 1 supra
(deletion of the intent requirement).
43. See MDPA, Prefatory Note and comments at 6; Florida Prosecutor, Aug.
1980, at 1.
44. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980), currently on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
45. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
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cal to Florida's new statute were held constitutional.
While there has been a rash of current cases46 challenging drug
paraphernalia statutes and ordinances, most of these statutes have not
been MDPA-based. Again, however, the lack of intent in the possession
section of the Florida statute distinguishes it from the statutes dealt
with in those cases.47 The arguments presented in these cases, however,
have relevance in challenges to MDPA-based laws, such as Florida's.
The success of the new law can be predicted to some extent from the
experience of other jurisdictions, and from the experience of some Flor-
ida cities and counties' 8 which enacted drug paraphernalia laws prior
to and contemporaneous with state adoption of the MDPA.49
The primary grounds for the challenge of most drug paraphernalia
laws have been similar, i.e. (1) violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment by being both vague and overbroad, (2) de-
nial of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
(3) impermissible burden on interstate commerce.50 It was on the first
basis that Indiana's statute" was found invalid.52 Not only did it un-
46. Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) gives a list of
such cases:
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, No. 78-C-2114
(N.D. I11. Feb. 11, 1980); Indiana Chapter NORML v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-
C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980) (en banc); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v.
Prince George's County, No. B-79-2385 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 1979); Record Mu-
seum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979); Tobacco Road,
Inc. v. City of Norre, No. 70-71000 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 1979); Cardarella v.
City of Overland Park, No. 86246 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 1980); Weingart v.
Town of Oyster Bay, No. 79-C-2932 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1979).
47. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
48. See Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-
6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v.
Pinellas County, No. 80-482 Civ-T-H (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1980). See also FBFFE,
Florida Newsletter, Apr. 15, 1980, at 1.
49. Id.
50. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
51. IND. CODE §§ 35-24.1-4-8 (1971) (repealed 1975); 35-48-4-8 (1971)
(amended 1977). For an article discussing Indiana's experience prior to 1976, as well
as a discussion of Florida's statute, see Note, Paraphernalia for Marijuana and Hash-
ish Use; Possession Statutes and Indiana's Pipe Dream, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 353 (1975-
76).
52. No. TH-75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980) (en banc).
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constitutionally fail to meet due process requirements of definiteness
and notice to those subject to the sanction, it also provided insufficient
guidelines to those charged with enforcing the law.53
Vagueness and overbreadth existed because many objects arguably
within the scope of the statute included instruments which could be
used for legitimate purposes as well as for the administration of
drugs.' This reasoning also played a role in Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gib-
son,55 where a major distributor of cigarette papers obtained a declara-
tory judgment. While the ordinance challenged in Bambu was specific
rather than vague, it was overbroad since it included articles with
"overwhelmingly lawful uses."'5' Alternatively, in the challenge to
Florida's new statute, vagueness was found to be the only meritorious
argument.5 7
These same contentions can arguably be applied to section 893.145
of Florida's new statute.5 8 However, 59 in Record Revolution, No. 6 and
World Imports, ° the specific definition of drug paraphernalia accom-
panied by the pivotal mens rea requirement save the law from vague-
ness and overbreadth.
Defendants argued in Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v.
State"1 that the three tests of intent in the definition of drug parapher-
nalia, "used, intended for use, or designed for use," 62 established the
intent requirement for the entire statute.6 s Both sides of the controversy
agreed that a statute requiring proof of use, intent to use, or knowledge
that an item would be illegally used would meet the standard necessary
to uphold the law as constitutional." The court there did not find the
definition of drug paraphernalia as dispositive in establishing the intent
53. Id., slip op. at 12-14.
54. Id..
55. 474 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J. 1979).
56. Id. at 1305.
57. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
58. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
59. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
60. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
61. No. TA 80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
62. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
63. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
64. Id., slip op. at 6.
10
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requirement for the possession offense.6 5 "Nothing in the definition can
be fairly said to link the use, intent, or design to the person charged
with a paraphernalia crime." 66 Consequently, the possession offense
was found to be an unconstitutionally defined crime and was struck
down. 7
An examination of the definition itself may show some weakness in
its language. The "used" test is clear, e.g. if an individual actually uses
an item with a controlled substance, then that item is drug parapherna-
lia.68 However, even here intent cannot be bootstrapped from mere pos-
session. There must be sufficient circumstantial evidence to support this
presumption, 9 such as statements and attendant circumstances. Failure
to include the intent element in the possession offense renders moot this
"used" test in Florida's new statute.
The other two intent tests do not share the clarity of the "used"
test. "Intended for use"70 is susceptible of several interpretations. Is
this the intent of the purchaser, retailer, or manufacturer? If it is the
former, then there is undue burden on both the retailer and the manu-
facturer to determine the subjective intent of the purchaser.7 1 In addi-
tion, they face prosecution for the use of an item far beyond their
control.
Problems of transferred intent may also arise if the "intended for
use ' 7 2 element is considered that of the seller. Either purchaser or
manufacturer could be prosecuted on the basis of the seller's intent.
Finally, if the intent is considered to be that of the manufacturer, both
purchasers and retailers may be subject to prosecution even though
they may lack any criminal intent. These problems were recognized in
a recent challenge to an MDPA-based city ordinance, Florida Busi-
nessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood,7 8 where the court
65. Id.
66. Id., slip op. at 8.
67. Id., slip op. at 9, 12.
68. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
69. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945).
70. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
71. Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.N.J. 1980).
72. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
73. No. 80-6157 Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
11
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found that these interpretations would not survive judicial scrutiny.74
Rather, the court supported the DEA'S view of intent that each defen-
dant "must have general criminal intent with respect to the offenses
alleged."175
The court in Indiana Chapter of NORML, Inc. v. Sendak 8 also
found the last intent test, "designed for use,""7 insufficiently clear. In
contrast, the Record Revolution 8 court dismissed concerns over the
latter two tests of intent by construing the definition of drug parapher-
nalia in terms of the intent of the individual or entity charged with
violation of the law."17 The court noted that a blanket prohibition of
every item used with drugs would be imprecise and lead to selective
enforcement.80 By defining drug paraphernalia in terms of the intent of
the individual or entity in control, MDPA-based laws have purportedly
avoided this problem. The law supposedly would not affect first amend-
ment rights or innocently held property of individuals who lack guilty
intent."1
For an item to be classified as drug paraphernalia, one of the
three types of intent must be present. 2 Without proof of the requisite
intent, there can be no conviction for the sale or manufacture of drug
paraphernalia because the item in question would not be drug
paraphernalia.
The Drug Enforcement Administration contends that a statute
which "embodies a specific intent to violate the law"'88 is not unconsti-
tutionally vague. Alternatively, it can be argued that this statute is not
vague only to those who do intend to violate the law. Other innocent
individuals without guilty intent are left with only their own subjective
understanding of what the law requires. Further, the intent standard
74. Id., slip op. at 7.
75. Id.
76. No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980).
77. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
78. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 8, citing United States v. Brunnet, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931).
81. MDPA, supra note 2, at 9, 12.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 7, citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
(1952); 325 U.S. 91, 101.
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seems to be contradicted by the latter portion of section 893.146(5),8"
which gives one of the factors to be used in determination of drug para-
phernalia: "The innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, as to a direct violation of the act shall not prevent a finding that
the object is intended for use, or designed to use, as drug parapherna-
lia."85 If the owner or one in control of an object is innocent, e.g., does
not have the guilty intent or knowledge, then the item is not drug para-
phernalia under a "used for, intended for use, or designed for use"8 6
standard.
An additional problem exists with the necessary element of intent.
It can only be proven at the trial level. Prior to that, law enforcement is
free to selectively enforce the law, posssibly rendering Florida's statute
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In fact, the new statute may have been designed for this purpose. A
Florida Senate Staff analysis and economic impact statement indicates
that the intent of the legislature was to affect the retail sales of "head
shops."'8 7 As in Record Museum v. Lawrence Township,88 the law can-
not be lawfully applied only to head shops. Advocates of Florida's new
law argue that it does apply to all individuals, as did the court in Re-
cord Revolution.89 Nonetheless, factors to be used in the determination
of what is drug paraphernalia suggest otherwise. Specifically, section
893.146(10) states: "Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the
object is a legitimate [emphasis added] supplier of like or related items
to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer or tobacco
products."' 0 This section seems to indicate that a licensed distributor or
dealer of tobacco products can sell items that might otherwise be
deemed drug paraphernalia while a retailer not in this category may
not. The court in Record Revolution found the undefined term "legiti-
mate" to also fail the test of vagueness by creating a danger of arbi-
84. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(5).
85. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(5) (Supp. 1980).
86. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
87. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 17, 1980
(Bill No. and Sponsor: S.B. 291, Senator Poole).
88. 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
90. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(10) (Supp. 1980).
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trary and discriminatory enforcement."1 On the other hand, the court
in Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood 2
found no vagueness either in the indicia of what may be considered
drug paraphernalia, or on the issue of legitimacy.93
The "reasonably should have known" phraseology 94 in Florida's
new statute at section 893.147(2) 95 and section 903.147(4)96 has also
been an issue in other cases challenging MDPA-based laws. The court
in Record Revolution 7 found that the element of actual knowledge
would protect the due process rights of criminal defendants, while the
constructive knowledge standard would not.98 The Record Revolution
court cited Knoedler v. Roxbury's99 discussion of the problems:
[T]he seller faced with the Roxbury Ordinance has to . . . deter-
mine what the customer intends to do with the items of purchase. Cer-
tainly in a case where the purchaser announces his or her intention to
utilize the paraphernalia purchased for an illegal purpose, the seller
would be placed in no dilemma; however, the question arises as to what
would create a reasonable belief in the mind of the seller in the absence
of such an unlikely announcement by the purchaser. Does the pur-
chaser's age, sex, mannerism or dress afford to a seller reason to believe
that the paraphernalia will be used for an illegal purpose. Or should the
nature of the purchaser's companions or the items he or she carries be
determinative? These questions indicate the difficulty that a merchant,
as well as a law enforcement officer, would have, in the absence of an
admission by the purchaser, in determining what gives rise to a reason-
able belief that a purchaser intends to utilize the paraphernalia for an
illegal purpose. An additional concern is whether it is proper to charge
an owner of a department store, or any other store, with responsibility
for a sales clerk's determination as to whether the person purchasing an
item, especially an innocuous one such as a weight scale or a spoon, in-
91. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
92. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
93. Id. at 6.
94. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.147(2), 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
95. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(2) (Supp. 1980).
96. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
97. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
98. Id., slip op. at 15.
99. 485 F. Supp. 990.
1 76 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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tends to utilize it for some improper and illegal purpose."0
In light of this discussion, the court in Record Revolution noted
that "defining the offense of knowingly distributing drug paraphernalia
in terms of the weakness of an individual's ability to perceive"1 1
provided insufficient guidelines to both sellers and law enforcement
officials. World Imports Inc. v. Woodbridge Township,0 2 and Florida
Businessmen For Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood °3 stand in op-
position to this reasoning,' 04 holding that the "reasonably should have
known" 1' 0 5 standard does not significantly differ from the actual knowl-
edge standard.'" In their view, there would be no difference between
the two standards in practical application.07
In addition to the possibility of selective enforcement against re-
tailers, there is an issue which current cases have not discussed, e.g.,
the strong probability of selective enforcement against individuals.
Current jewelry fashions include small spoon or razor blade necklaces
which law enforcement may consider drug paraphernalia, and for
which an individual could be arrested regardless of his or her intent.
The same is true of possession of ornamental water pipes, bowls, sifters,
alligator clips, scales, mirrors with "cocaine" imprinted on them, and a
myriad of other objects. Display of these items may be considered sym-
bolic speech since that action may be a non-verbal expression of sup-
port for reform of drug laws or as a protest to current drug laws.
"Where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms it operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] free-
doms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas
were clearly marked."'x0 8 With the threat of arrest, individuals may
avoid conduct which is privileged under the first amendment.
100. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
101. Id., slip op. at 15.
102. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
103. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
104. No. TA80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
105. FLA. STAT. § 893.14 (Supp. 1980).
106. No. 80-1414, slip op. at 6; No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR, slip op. at 6.
107. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR, slip op. at 6.
108. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
1 5:1980
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Prohibitions on advertisement of drug paraphernalia, such as sec-
tion 893.147(4),109 have also been challenged on grounds of vagueness,
overbreadth and undue interference with first amendment protected
commercial speech. In Record Museum v. Lawrence Township,110 de-
claratory and injunctive relief was granted on these grounds. The court
noted that even speech which has only a commercial purpose warrants
first amendment protection."-" Further, seeking out speech of particular
content and preventing its dissemination completely, exceeds legitimate
restrictions on commercial speech. 12 These arguments were dismissed
in Record Revolutionl l' and in Florida Businessmen for Free Enter-
prise v. State11 4 when the court held that if the speech solicited illegal
activity it was not protected.11  However, some courts set standards for
a first amendment exception higher than these courts. For an exception
to apply, the speech must be directed to "inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such action." 11 6
Arguably, the purpose of advertisements for items that may be used as
drug paraphernalia is not to advocate illegal acts, but rather to present
availability of goods for sale. Alternatively, if instructions or statements
are included as to the use of controlled substances or encouraging their
use, this would fall under the exception to protected speech. Advertise-
ments of availability of goods do not, unless it can be shown that the
advertiser actually possessed the guilty knowledge or intent required.
Nor could advertisements from other states be prohibited. Interstate
dissemination of information by the citizen of a state in which an activ-
ity is legal may not be barred under the guise of state police power117
Contrary to these arguments, the court in Florida Businessmen for
109. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
110. 481 F. Supp. 768.
111. Id. at 774.
112. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
113. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
114. No. TA 80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
115. Id., slip op. at 11; No. C-80-38, slip op. at 21 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
116. High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (1978), citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
117. 456 F. Supp. at 1041 (1978), citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
178 51980 1
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/6
Drug Paraphernalia5:1980
Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood118 reasoned that the "free flow of
information concerning drug paraphernalia has a potentially deleterious
effect upon the community." 119 The court concluded that the chal-
lenged ordinance was valid and that possession, manufacture, and de-
livery of drug paraphernalia could be proscribed. It then reasoned that
"advertising intended to 'promote the sale of objects designed or in-
tended for use as drug paraphernalia' [could also] be prohibited."' 1 0
The advertising restriction in High 0l' Times, Inc. v. Busbee"2'
also failed for lack of either a compelling state interest or a significant
state policy to be effected. 22 Commercial speech cannot be banned on
the basis of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is detrimental.223
Inability to demonstrate that the chosen statutory course would lead to
the desired result invalidated the proposed restriction in High 0l'
Times.' 24 However, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of
Hollywood 25 held that the community's interest was validly served by
preventing proliferation of drug paraphernalia.
In the wake of that decision it is interesting to examine the under-
lying purpose of drug paraphernalia laws. Such an examination raises a
chicken-egg debate: Does possession, sale, and manufacture of items
which could be used as drug paraphernalia contribute to drug abuse,
or, does drug abuse foster the possession, sale, and manufacture of drug
paraphernalia? To mix metaphors, the proverbial horse is out of the
barn on the latter question as it appears that the development of the
accessories industry is a recent phenomenon growing out of the popu-
larity of recreational drug use. With adoption of the MDPA, 26 Florida
is attempting to close the door to an already empty stall. The new stat-
ute will affect the manufacture and sale of some items which may be
used as drug paraphernalia, but it will not affect drug abuse. The rate
of recreational drug use combined with the easy availability of common
118. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
119. Id., slip op. at 9.
120. Id.
121. 456 F. Supp. 1035.
122. Id. at 1043.
123. Linmark Assoc., Inc., v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977).
124. 456 F. Supp. at 1043.
125. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
126. MDPA, supra note 2.
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substitutes for paraphernalia assures this.
The final grounds of challenge to MDPA-based laws has been un-
constitutional infringement on the commerce clause by impermissable
burden on interstate commerce. 127 Using the three part test of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,128 the court in Record Revolution 29 found the
ordinance served a legitimate concern, the intent elements limited the
scope of the ordinance, and the impact on interstate commerce was
thus minimized. 80 In contrast, the court in Bambu"31 ruled that the
plaintiff's constitutional rights included the right to own and deal in
property, e.g., cigarette papers, and to engage in interstate commerce
of them. Infringement of those rights caused the ordinance to be over-
broad and unenforceable as to the manufacturer and distributors.1 32
Section 893.147(2) could arguably fall on either of these opposite sides.
Conclusion
Due to problems of vagueness and overbreadth, the section
893.145(1) standard of "intended for use, or designed for use" should
be deleted from Florida's new drug paraphernalia statute. For the same
reasons so should section 893.146(5) and section 893.146(1) and the
"reasonably should know" standard of section 893.147(2) and section
893.147(4). In adopting a modified version of the MDPA, Florida may
only have succeeded in making the symptoms of drug abuse illegal
without addressing the problem of drug abuse itself. The legitimate
purpose of protecting children from undue influence and encourage-
ment to abuse drugs may be better served by more effective drug abuse
education and prevention programs, demonstration of family and socie-
tal attitudes discouraging drug abuse, and laws prohibiting sale and
distribution to minors of items most commonly used as drug parapher-
nalia. It is not necessary to go to the lengths of Florida's new statute to
achieve this result.
Faye Jones
127. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
128. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
129. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
130. Id., slip op. at 26.
131. 474 F. Supp. 1297.
132. ld. at 1305-06.
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